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INTRODUCTION
Self-Judging Self-Defense
by Oscar Schachter*
The four leading articles in this issue are concerned with the legal justi-fication for the use of force by national states. The issues they deal
with are not academic, nor are they of concern to lawyers alone. We all
live under the menace of international violence. Our personal lives are
profoundly affected by the material and psychic costs of that insecurity.
It is only natural that we look to law for the elements of security. It is,
after all, the legal system that sets the limits to force in national societies
and provides institutions and procedures to give effect to those limits.
International society has reached for the same goal during this cen-
tury. It has adopted a set of basic rules in the Charter of the United
Nations (to which nearly all States adhere) and it has given more con-
crete meaning to those rules through declarations, resolutions and trea-
ties. The rules make it clear that national states are no longer free to use
force "against the political independence or territorial integrity" of a
state or in any manner contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.,
However, force is recognized as legitimate when used in self-defense or
pursuant to a decision of the United Nations Security Council.2 The
Charter has thus drawn a legal line between permissible and impermissi-
ble uses of force. It has also established community institutions - the
Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of
Justice - that are competent under certain conditions to pass on the legiti-
macy of the use of force and to take measures to ensure peace and
security.
* Hamilton Fish Professor Emeritus of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia Univer-
sity; member, Institut de Droit International; past President, American Society of International
Law; former Co-editor in chief, American Journal of International Law; former Director, United
Nations Legal Department.
1 U.N. Charter, art. 2(4).
2 U.N. Charter, art. 51, 42. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH.
L. REv. 1620 (1984).
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As we know, this system of law and collective security has not func-
tioned as envisaged. States have resorted to force unilaterally and in
some cases collectively, in apparent violation of the Charter principles
and in defiance of decisions by competent international organs. Where
states have used force, they have generally asserted that such force was
employed in individual or collective self-defense. Thus they have not de-
nied the legal force of the Charter rules but have relied on an expressly
recognized legal right. As many have observed, self-defense has become
the modern equivalent of "just war." The obvious difficulty is that the
states employing armed force decide for themselves the conditions under
which they may resort to self-defense and they reject on grounds of prin-
ciple or practicality, determinations by international organs. It is not
surprising that their justifications are often perceived as no more than
rhetoric.
The authors of the articles that follow are aware, of course, of this
weakness but they do not directly address this issue. Their underlying
premise, as I read them, is that a law-abiding state will consider as its
obligation and presumably its enlightened self-interest to comply with
the law. Hence, they consider it important and realistic to clarify the
concept of self-defense as applied to new situations and conditions.
Three of the articles - those by Intoccia, McCredie and Roberts - ex-
amine self-defense in response to state sponsored terrorism directed
against nationals of a target state. They are lucid well-argued presenta-
tions that support the United States bombing of Tripoli in retaliation for
Libya's involvement in an attack on U.S. military personnel in Berlin.
However, since others have expressed conflicting views as to the evidence
and motivation of the United States, the articles implicitly raise the ques-
tion of third party review and appraisal.
The same question is raised, even more sharply, by Professor
Zedalis' article on anticipatory self-defense. The article goes beyond the
usual lawyers' analysis of the rules into an appraisal of values and poli-
cies underlying the rules. On that value-oriented approach, the author
finds some merit in allowing a preemptive defensive action against a
threat of future attack. He would impose two main conditions (1) that
the threat of future attack be probable and (2) that no neutralizing
counter-measures to meet the threat are available. The article suggests
that preemptive war might even be justified against an adversary who has
acquired a high degree of protection through defensive technology and
who may consequently be perceived as a probable threat because of its
protective cover. One wonders whether the Soviet Union might use this
kind of reasoning to justify a preemptive attack on the United States be-
cause of the threat inherent in a successful strategic defense technology.
This possibility and the authors' emphasis on balancing values points up
the risks of purely unilateral decisions.
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The four articles compel us to face up to the difficult and perhaps
intractable problem of imposing legal limits on the exercise of self-de-
fense in the absence of compulsory adjudication and centralized interna-
tional authority. Consider the positions taken by the present
Administration of the United States during and subsequent to the pro-
ceedings of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaraguan case.
One was that claims of self-defense by a state employing force are review-
able solely by the United Nations Security Council pursuant to Article
51. That Article, it was said, confers exclusive authority on the Council
and impliedly excludes other organs such as the Court or General As-
sembly from passing judgment on the legality of the use of force.3 On
this view, if the Security Council does not decide by the required major-
ity that the use of force is impermissible, the state is free to use such force
as it deems necessary and proportional. The consequence of this position
is that those members with the right of veto namely the United States,
the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France, remain entirely free to
judge for themselves whether their use of force is legal. Moreover, an
additional effect is that any one of those states may unilaterally deter-
mine that any other state is also free to use force when that state consid-
ers such force to be necessary self-defense. A more direct argument for a
unilateral self-judging principle was also advanced by U.S. legal advisers
namely, that the exercise of self-defense cannot be subject to the decision
of any external body inasmuch as it involves national security. As ex-
plained by the State Department legal adviser "such matters are the ulti-
mate responsibility assigned by our constitution to the President and the
Congress." 4 The Legal Adviser did not add that all other states would be
entitled to take the same position but this was, of course, clearly implied.
In claiming that self-defense is entirely and exclusively a matter for
each state to decide, the U.S. position contradicts the prevailing concep-
tion of self-defense as a legal right. For it is incontrovertible that if a
state or an individual claiming a right has the exclusive authority to de-
cide on the lawfulness of its exercise, the law has reached a vanishing
point. This was recognized by the International Tribunal at Nuremberg
in 1946 when it rejected the argument of the counsel for the Nazi leaders
that Germany had acted in self-defense and that every state is the judge
of whether in a given case, it has the right of self-defense. The Judgment
of the Tribunal declared that "whether action taken under the claim of
self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject
to investigation or adjudication if international law is ever to be en-
3 Sofaer, Statement in Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organization of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1985).
4 Id. at 13. See also Sofaer, Statement to Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 2105 DEP'T ST.
BULL 58, (1985).
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forced."5 The International Court of Justice in its decisions in Nicaragua
v. United States also rejected the U.S. arguments that a claim of self-
defense was not justiciable. It declared:
"As to the inherent right of self-defense, the fact that it is referred to in
the Charter as a right is indicative of its legal dimension." 6
The American member of the Court, Judge Schwebel, who disagreed
with the majority on a number of issues, concurred with their conclusion
that the right of self-defense was justiciable.' Schwebel quoted some
comments of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht which merit repetion here:
The right of self-defense is a general principle of law and as such it is
necessarily recognized to its full extent in international law .... It is
recognized to the extent - but no more - that recourse to it is not itself
illegal. It is regulated to the extent that it is the business of the courts
to determine whether, how far and for how long there was a necessity
to have recourse to it. There is not the slightest relation between the
content of the right of self-defense and the claim that it is above the
law and not amenable to evaluation by the law. Such a claim is self-
contradictory inasmuch as it purports to be based on legal right and as,
at the same time, it dissociates itself from regulation and evaluation by
the law.8
The view expressed in this passage treats self-defense in international law
esentially as it is recognized in national law - namely, that a state, like an
individual, has the right to decide in the first instance whether immediate
action to use force is necessary but that the ultimate judgment of lawful-
ness must be made by the larger community. To maintain that the state
or the individual has the final word on self-defense would make a sham of
the legal restraints on the use of force.
This is not, of course, the end of the matter. For it can be argued
that as long as states generally do not accept compulsory adjudication by
a court, the requirement of community review and judgment remains an
unrealized ideal. Consequently, it is said to be unrealistic to expect a
state to submit its actions to the judgment of a tribunal or other interna-
tional organ when others are not required to do so and compliance is
essentially voluntary. Stated in more political terms, why should the
United States submit to international adjudication when the Soviet
Union, China and France do not? Would this not be contrary to the
5 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 1 Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 208 (1967).
6 Military and Paramilitary Actions in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J.
392, 436 (Judgment of Nov. 26.)
7 Id. Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion to Judgment of June 27, 1986 (Merits) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 284-
87.
8 H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 179-80
(1933).
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national interest? Although this line of reasoning may have an initial
appeal, it does not withstand closer analysis.
For one thing, the argument does not adequately take into account
the basic long term interest of the United States in achieving a secure and
stable world order. That objective has long been perceived by the United
States as requiring a clear distinction between the lawful and unlawful
use of force. The main step toward that end was taken in the United
Nations Charter and other treaty obligations adhered to by the United
States. These obligations were not conditioned on the universal accept-
ance of compulsory jurisdiction. Nor did states reserve a unilateral right
to decide on the legitimacy of self-defense.9 To introduce these condi-
tions at the present time is to repudiate the essence of the obligations
widely accepted as necessary to international order. The political effect
of such unilateralism is far from minimal. In effect, the Soviet Union is
being told that the legality of its use of force in Afghanistan claimed by it
as collective self-defense, is a matter for it alone to judge. A similar
message goes to all other states, great and small. Can it be plausibly
maintained that these messages would further the U.S. interest in a stable
and lawful international society?
What of the argument that submission of self-defense claims to an
international tribunal would endanger the security of the United States
and impinge on the constitutional responsibilities of the President and
the Congress? One part of an answer is that, under the law, recourse to
self-defense is in the first instance left to the state that considers itself
attacked or in imminent danger of attack. The United States has not
given up the right nor would it do so by submitting to a subsequent judg-
ment of the community. Can it be said that the acceptance of an obliga-
tion to exercise self-defense only in accordance with international law
violates the constitutional authority of the President and the Congress?
The short answer is that the obligation was accepted in accordance with
constitutional processes when the Charter was ratified. Neither the Pres-
ident nor the Congress has since made any statement that would deny
the legal effect of the Charter rules.
Much has been made of the fact that other major powers, and in
particular, the Soviet Union have similarly refused to accept interna-
tional determinations as obligatory. The implication is that the United
States would disadvantage itself if it were more respectful of international
decisions than the Soviet Union. But by taking the conduct of the
U.S.S.R. as the standard of U.S. performance, the United States puts its
weight on the side of a world order in which might makes right. Even
apart from this fundamental point, it is hard to see what political gain is
achieved by considering Soviet disregard of international judgments as an
9 See Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 7 at 51-60.
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excuse for American noncompliance. The fact that the U.S.S.R. has not
heeded the resolution of the United Nations General A.sembly that it
withdraw its troops from Afghanistan has been rightly criticized by the
United States and many other states. Does the United States achieve any
political advantage by declaring that it too can ignore United Nations
decisions condemning its use of force? All it means is the the U.S. incurs
the same opprobrium and political costs as has the Soviet Union. We can
hardly regard this as political realism, let alone appropriate respect for
the opinions of mankind.
It is perhaps too often forgotten in international law discussions that
international review and evaluation do not depend on acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction. The truth is that whenever a state has recourse to
armed force outside its borders, the legitimacy of that action is judged by
other states, by international organs, by non-governmental groups and by
concerned individuals everywhere. These judgments may be made by
political organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly.
They command attention, when the resolutions receive a large majority
and especially when that majority includes governments allied to or gen-
erally sympathetic to the impugned states. The resolutions concerning
Afghanistan and Grenada fall into that category. Even if these decisions
lack the binding authority of judicial decisions, they impose political
costs on the offending state. Such condemnations by large majorities
have contributed to transforming the image of a great power from a
champion of national independence to that of a threat to the sovereignty
of weaker states. Neither superpower has escaped this effect and its neg-
ative consequences. It is true of course that even if states cannot escape
collective judgments, they may still decide to disregard them. In most
cases, they need not fear effective collective sanctions. But they are sub-
ject to losses of credibility, to retaliatory measures, and to weakening the
fabric of order on which they must rely to co-exist. This does not
amount to enforcement in the sense of domestic law. But it does mean
that the illicit use of force when condemned by others is far from cost
free.
All in all, a sober view of the U.S. national interest in this respect
supports the long standing commitment to an international rule of law in
regard to the use of force. It would be a mistake to consider the recent
statements of U.S. officials made under the stress of the Nicaraguan Case
as conclusive evidence of a lasting reversal of the American commitment.
Surely the Congress and the people do not favor permitting states to use
force freely whenever such use is called self-defense. Nor would they be
so naive as to maintain that the United States could have a unilateral
right to resort to force that is denied to all others. As a matter of realistic
self-interest, the United States will have to treat claims of self-defense as
subject to legal restraints. Its efforts should be directed to giving effect to
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such restraints, not merely by elaborating principles but, more impor-
tant, by specific legal regimes that set limits on force and include means
of verification."° The United Nations and the regional organizations
could play an enhanced role in this regard.
These steps are likely to be more effective in constraining the illegiti-
mate use of force than recourse to the International Court. For a variety
of reasons, it is unlikely that the Court could have a major role in limit-
ing the use of force. On the other hand, there is no a priori reason why
the Court may not be utilized by states under some circumstances to
resolve disputes as to the legality of specific self-defense measures. The
United States itself recognized the utility of the Court when it instituted
proceedings in the International Court of Justice against the U.S.S.R.,
Czechoslavokia and Hungary for the shooting down of U.S. airplanes
under the claim of self-defense." To be sure, not all disputes over use of
force would be suitable for adjudication. A court may not be in a posi-
tion to determine critical issues of fact when armed hostilities are taking
place or the crucial issues may be political, with little or no significant
legal aspect. These limitations of adjudication should be taken into ac-
count. But that is not a reason to conclude that all disputes involving
claims of self-defense are unsuitable for judicial review and judgment. A
considered policy in this respect would lead to a new U.S. declaration of
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction that would confirm the national
interest in the rule of law including its application to the use of force.
However, a failure to accept the Court's jurisdiction should not be
construed as a repudiation of the legal limits on the use of force. Those
limits constitute a fundamental basis of co-existence in a plural society of
independent states. Whether or not the Court is given jurisdiction, it is
essential to recognize that any state which resorts to force can be held
internationally accountable if its use of force does not meet the legal re-
quirements of self-defense. This principle is almost a truism but it should
nonetheless be affirmed by the United States so as to remove any doubt as
to its position created by statements made in connection with the Nicara-
guan Case.
10 For example of such treaty regimes, see Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the
Use of Force, 53 U. Cm. L. REv 113, 135 note 94 (1986).
11 See Schachter, Disputes Involving the Use of Force in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AT A
CROSSROADS 223 (L.F. Damrosch ed. 1987).
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